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Earth has surpassed its sustainable human carrying capacity

Corey J. A. Bradshaw^{1,2,*}, Melinda A. Judge^{3,4}, Daniel T. Blumstein^{5,6}, Paul R. Ehrlich⁷, Aisha N. Z. Dasgupta^{8,†}, Mathis Wackernagel^{9,10}, Lewis J. Z. Weeda¹¹, and Peter N. Le Souëf¹¹

¹ Global Ecology | *Partuyarta Ngadluku Wardli Kuu*, College of Science and Engineering, Flinders University, GPO Box 2100, Adelaide, South Australia 5001, Australia

² Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Indigenous and Environmental Histories and Futures, Cairns, Queensland, Australia

³ The Kids Research Institute Australia, Perth, Western Australia, Australia

⁴ School of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Western Australia, Western Australia, Australia

⁵ Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, USA

⁶ Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of California, Los Angeles, California, USA

⁷ Department of Biology, 327 Campus Drive, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, USA

⁸ UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, King Charles Street, London SW1A 2AH, United Kingdom

⁹ Global Footprint Network, Oakland, California, USA

¹⁰ Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of California, Los Angeles, California, USA

¹¹ School of Medicine, University of Western Australia, Western Australia, Australia

*Author to whom any correspondence should be addressed.

†The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office

E-mail: corey.bradshaw@flinders.edu.au

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Abstract

The ecological concept of human carrying capacity is necessarily complicated because human beings are the “ultimate ecosystem engineers” who moderate the environment for their benefit. For at least the last few hundred years, human ingenuity, access to massive stocks of fossil fuels, and technological development have driven facilitation whereby increasing human abundance has promoted higher population growth rates. However, this positive relationship broke down during the 1950s, and by 1962, the global human population entered a phase where the growth rate consistently declined as population increased. The onset of this negative phase occurred 8 years before a global biocapacity deficit began in 1970. The onset of the negative phase also varies regionally, with the lowest-income and highest fertility regions entering this phase later than higher-income regions. A Ricker logistic model fitted to the negative phase predicts that the global population could reach 11.7 to 12.4 billion people between 2067 and 2076. The same model fitted to the facilitation phase predicts a maximum population of 2.5 billion people that Earth might be able to maintain. The negative phase also correlates strongly with the trend in global temperature anomaly, ecological footprint, and total emissions, with more of its variation explained by increasing population size rather than increasing per-capita consumption. The Earth cannot sustain the future human population, or even today’s, without a major overhaul of socio-cultural practices for using land, water, energy, biodiversity, and other resources.

Keywords: carrying capacity, climate change, consumption, population growth, temperature anomaly

1. Introduction

Human beings undoubtedly have the best-studied demography of any species, yet for most of human existence, there were no accurate censuses of population size, nor estimates of age structure, birth, or death rates. However, since the 1950s when global population censuses began in earnest [1], we now have an in-depth appreciation for how population structure has changed in response to shifting economics [2], social dynamics [3], education [4], culture [5,6], health interventions [7,8], family planning [2,9], marriage patterns [10], migration [2,11], warfare [12], and disease [13], among others. Yet despite the wealth of data and analyses on human demography, we still have a poor understanding of how the global human population might respond to its own processes of self-facilitation and limitation within the constraints of environmental feedbacks [2], especially considering we have data for only a tiny fraction of the history of *Homo sapiens*. Additionally, the demography-environment nexus is generally under-developed in the field of human demography [14-16], despite environmental variation being one of the principal mechanisms determining patterns of human demographic change [14].

Carrying capacity is an ecological concept describing the long-term average maximum number of individuals of a particular species (typically measured as a density in individuals per unit area and denoted K) an environment can sustain indefinitely given the available regenerative resources [17-19]. In mathematical terms, K can be calculated as the long-term mean population size (N) where the *per capita* rate of exponential population change (r) approaches zero [17,18] (Supplementary Material Appendix I, Fig. S1). This phenomenological relationship is the *ensemble* expression of *component* feedback [20] — the process by which interactions among individuals and groups affect component demographic rates (e.g., survival, fertility, and dispersal). Variation in the components in turn ‘feed back’ directly or indirectly to alter population size and the demographic rates themselves [21]. There are two main types of phenomenological relationship between r and N — *negative* where the rate of population growth declines as population size increases, and *facilitation*, a special case where the rate of population growth rises as the population increases [21].

Applied to human populations, the concept of carrying capacity is necessarily complicated because human beings are the “ultimate ecosystem engineers” who deliberately and successfully moderate the environment for their

benefit [22,23]. In contrast to non-human species limited by the regenerative resource base on which they depend directly, modern humans have essentially eradicated the limiting feedback from resource depletion via the exploitation of fossil fuels. Other reasons why the concept of ecological carrying capacity applied to human populations is cumbersome is because of the huge variation in the amount of resources used and environmental damage caused by individuals [24], the access to non-renewable stocks of resources that can complement regenerative resources, and the difficulty in determining what technological innovations and standards of living are considered ‘acceptable’ [22] at any given population size and fertility rate. The latter reason is possibly the most intractable element when applying carrying capacity to human beings, because K has different interpretations depending on the economic system and technologies at play, whether societies endeavour to reduce inequality, over what period of time one decides to apply the criteria, how much environmental damage we are willing to endure or accept [23,25], and at which point the environmental damage is so great and the human load so high that those physical conditions start to limit the size of human populations directly. In addition, Rees [26] argued that technological innovation often does not increase K *per se*, but only the efficiency of resource use, which can create the illusion of increase while shielding people from perceiving the permanent damage to the resource base.

Another complication is that despite the well-documented, planetary-wide ecological and extinction crisis underway [22,27,28] made possible by the exploitation of fossil fuels, and the observation that human societies have long ago exceeded the Earth’s ‘biocapacity’ (i.e., the productivity of ecological assets, including cropland, grazing land, forest land, fishing grounds, and built-up land) [29], gross measures of human wellbeing are generally at historical highs; for example, absolute poverty is declining [30] (although country-specific poverty is rising) [30], as is child mortality [31], while longevity is mostly increasing [32]; however, longevity has potentially been reduced by the effects of COVID-19, under-nutrition has increased [33] by ~ 30% between 2017 and 2021, and obesity is rising [32]. This apparent paradox has come at a cost to the stability of humanity’s life-support system, and a massive increase in dependence on fossil fuels, which is in turn threatening the very life-support system that sustains this population via resultant climate change, while also blinding societies to finite, regenerative biological resources as long as fossil fuel-based alternatives are available. The pressures on the

1
2
3 biosphere also stem from persistent overuse, including
4 past carbon emissions. This means that the stressors are
5 the outcome of cumulative, historical overuse, not just
6 current activities. Together, these stressors limit continued
7 improvement, and are instead likely to or have already
8 started to reduce standards of living [27,34].

9
10 As a result, there have been many scientific
11 discussions of human carrying capacity [19,22-25,35-37],
12 with no clear consensus on either its value [23] or even
13 relevance to modern human society. However, most
14 appear to agree that for human beings, ‘optimum’ carrying
15 capacity is considerably lower than ‘maximum’ (or
16 ‘biophysical’) carrying capacity [24,25,37]. The qualifier
17 ‘optimum’ appears to refer to a feedback connected to an
18 enhancement of wellbeing via socio-economic
19 development and environmental integrity [22], such as the
20 maximum number people that can be sustained at a
21 minimum standard of living [36,37], rather than a
22 maximum density dictated instead by famine, disease, and
23 war [35].

24
25 To address the lack of evidence-based estimates of
26 human carrying capacity and the role of population itself
27 in affecting future human growth, we calculate using well-
28 established demographic analyses from ecology both a
29 realistic ‘facilitation’ (~ 2.5 billion) and maximum
30 (11.66–12.40 billion) global population size from the
31 available data describing trends in human abundance
32 estimates over the last century. Our predictions are the
33 first to be based on human population time series alone,
34 because no previous study has investigated the evidence
35 for relationships between r and N at the global or regional
36 scales. Such an investigation is important not only to
37 calculate empirical estimates of carrying capacity that do
38 not rely on unjustified or uncertain assumptions
39 underlying existing estimates of carrying capacity [23],
40 but also to identify whether population growth rates have
41 shifted in response to dwindling per-capita resources and
42 potential negative feedbacks from over-consumption.

43
44 Using population data from the United Nations and
45 other sources back to 1800, we show empirically that
46 human societies shifted from a long period of facilitation
47 (i.e., more people = higher instantaneous exponential rate
48 of annual increase) at the end of the 1940s, to one where
49 further increases in population size were associated with
50 consistently declining growth rate beginning in the 1960s
51 (negative phase). Further, we show for the first time that
52 the global temperature anomaly, ecological footprint, and
53 total emissions (indices of global environmental
54 deterioration) increased monotonically with increasing
55 population size during the most recent negative phase, and
56 that population size is a stronger predictor of the variation

in the indices of global change than rising per-capita
consumption rate.

2. Methods

2.1 Population trend and rate of change

We compiled the available estimates of human population
size back to 1000 AD, given that the period since then
includes estimates corroborated by several independent
analyses [1,38-46]. From these data, we calculated the
instantaneous (annual) exponential rate of change ($r =$
 $\log_e(N_{t+1}/N_t)$ and population size (N) at year t from 1800 to
2023 (because global population sizes are available in annual
increments during that period) [44].

We calculated the linear relationship between the annual
exponential rate of change (r) and global population size (N)
based on the phenomenological ‘Ricker’ (linear) [47] and
‘Gompertz’ (log-linear) [48] logistic models [20] in R
(function: *lm*). We contrasted the relative fits of the Ricker
and Gompertz logistic models using Akaike’s information
criterion weights ($wAIC_c$). However, these calculations of r
are not accompanied by any measured uncertainty provided
by the United Nations. Comparing historical revisions with
projections between 1970 and 2020 reveals only a modest
(1–2%) discrepancy, an uncertainty that agrees well with the
~ 1% variation observed among estimates from different
sources [49]. There is also evidence that the uncertainty
around population size estimates for different regions also
varies, but that uncertainty generally declines over time [50].
To test whether the trends we observed between r and N_t in
the three phases are robust in the face of uncertainty, we
designed a resampling approach where we assumed
uncertainties around annual N_t of 5% for the facilitation
phase (1800–1949), 2% for the transition phase (1950–1961),
and 1% for the negative phase (1962–2023). For each of
10,000 iterations, we sampled a random deviate uniformly
within these error ranges for each N_t in the series,
recalculated the corresponding r , and then calculated the
slope of the least-squares linear relationship between r and N_t
for each phase.

2.2 Carrying capacity

A phenomenological Ricker logistic model [20] predicts that
when a population’s $r = 0$ (stability, or zero population
‘growth’), the quotient of the negative intercept and slope of
the linear fit of $r \sim N_t$ estimates an expected ‘maximum’
population size (which we term ‘Ricker carrying capacity’,
 K_R). This is distinct from a (‘biophysical’) [37] carrying
capacity of the environment [24], which would be a
population size that could be sustained, and would not just
operate on stock depletion as it does currently. This
population K_R is reached at the point when total births are

perfectly offset by total deaths. As additional reality checks of the relationships, we extended the Ricker logistic model to the intercept (where $N_t = 0$) to calculate the theoretical maximum rate of increase [51]. Likewise, extending the depensation relationship back to $N_t = 0$ we calculated the expected r_m for ‘undeveloped’ societies in the absence of facilitation [52].

A ‘sustainable’ carrying capacity’ is considerably lower than a ‘maximum’ population size predicted at $r = 0$ using the Ricker model (K_R) [24,25,37]. This is because K_R is enabled by stock depletion, which allows people temporarily to overcome the limitations imposed by the regeneration rates of biological resource supplies. The ‘sustainable’ carrying capacity also depends on the average standard of living per individual. The higher the consumption per person, the lower the ‘sustainable’ carrying capacity. A world with a human population at a ‘sustainable’ carrying capacity is better than one at K_R , because the former population size is more likely to provide more stable economies, have lower negative environmental impacts, endure longer, have fewer risks, and maintain more cultures and values [25,53]. Given the evidence for an abrupt switch from facilitation to a negative $r \sim N$ phase (see Results), we calculated this lower carrying capacity as the population size where facilitation produced maximum r (henceforth denoted K_f). Here, we calculated the global population size when r was maximum during the 1800–1949 facilitation as K_f .

2.3 Regional differences

Treating the global population as a single unit potentially masks regional differences in the onset and strength of the negative relationship between r and N . As a form of sensitivity analysis to confirm that the global trend was not driven by particular regions and/or countries, we therefore divided the globe into seven main regions defined by the United Nations (Sub-Saharan Africa, northern Africa and western Asia, Europe and North America, Latin America and Caribbean, central and southern Asia, eastern and south-eastern Asia, and Oceania [+ Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand]) and calculated the $r \sim N$ relationship for each. We also extended the fits to $r = 0$ for each region’s negative phase to provide an estimate of K_R for each, and examined the regional differences in slope of $r \sim N$ relative to several demographic and economic indicators (Supplementary Material Appendix IV).

2.4 Correspondence to projections

We plotted the global prediction of K_R from the Ricker logistic model applied to the negative phase (Fig. 2b) against the most-plausible [31] projections of human population size to the end of this century (United Nations Population Division *Medium*, *High*, and *Probabilistic* scenarios) [1], and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and

the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre [IIASA-JRC] *Stalled* and *Reference* scenarios [54,55]. This approach identifies which projections have the best correspondence to the magnitude and timing our calculated K_R from the Ricker logistic model.

2.5 Indices of global change

We compared global human population size in the three main phases of facilitation, transition, and the negative $r \sim N$ phase (see Results) to the global temperature anomaly obtained from the HadCRUT.5.0.2.0 ensemble prediction anomaly [56] relative to the 1960–1991 baseline (data available from 1850 to the present). We hypothesize that the strongest positive relationship between human population size and climate change occurred during the negative phase because of consumption externalities such as increasing natural resource exploitation and loss of biodiversity. This can result from societies in the period of declining r and resources subsequently driving environmental degradation. In contrast, societies in the facilitation phase might have adequate resources to fuel increasing population growth rates. We also used two additional indices of global change in the analyses to corroborate the results using global temperature anomaly: global ecological footprint measured as the number of Earths required to meet consumption rates [29], and total annual CO₂-e emissions (ourworldindata.org). See the Supplementary Material Appendix III for the full methodology. All code and data underlying all analyses are available at doi:10.5281/zenodo.10951676.

3. Results

3.1 Population trend and rate of change

The trajectory of the global human population slowly increased (mean $r = 0.0009$) from an estimated 323 million in 1000 AD to 592 million in 1700 (Fig. 1a). From the onset of the Industrial Revolution in the mid-18th Century, the calculated rate of increase expanded considerably (mean $r = 0.005$, or 5 times the rate observed between 1000 and 1700 AD) to produce a global population of 985 million by 1800 (Fig. 1a). Population increase was consistently positive thereafter, despite at least 27 major mortality events (each with ≥ 1 million estimated casualties counted as excess deaths), four of which had ≥ 30 million casualties each — i.e., Taipeng rebellion (Platt 2012), ‘Spanish’ influenza pandemic [57], World War II [58], and the Chinese famine [59] (Fig. 1b). Following World War II when global population censuses began in earnest [1], we calculated that the global human population expanded at its fastest rate ever [2], reaching an average rate of increase of $r = 0.02$ between 1950 and 1970. This increase is known as the post-World War II Baby Boom of the 1950s and 1960s (Fig. 1b).

The linear relationship between the annual exponential rate of change (r) and global population size (N) shows a striking shift during the 1950s from facilitation (positive) to a negative phase (Fig. 2). From 1800 to 1949, there was a clear signal of facilitation — population growth rate increased with increasing global population size [21]. Here, the 95% confidence interval of the Ricker slope (β) was 0.0033–0.0046 ($R^2 = 0.488$). There was dominant support for the Ricker ($wAIC_c = 0.828$) relative to the Gompertz model ($wAIC_c = 0.172$; evidence ratio = $wAIC_c$ [Ricker]/ $wAIC_c$ [Gompertz] = 4.83). There was a weak autocorrelation signal in the r time series for the facilitation phase (partial autocorrelation function showed evidence for a lag effect = 1 year; Supplementary Material Appendix II Fig. S2), with a Newey-West correction for autocorrelation returning a slope of $\beta = 0.0024 - 0.0055$. This means that per-capita fitness (survival, reproduction) increased as the population increased (i.e., facilitation), implying self-reinforcement via technological and socio-economic improvements to living conditions [22].

The post-WWII Baby Boom during the 1950s precipitated a large increase in the growth rate, but destabilised the relationship between r and N_t (the negative r calculated for 1949–1950 is an artefact of global census data being standardised from 1950 onward — the human population did not decrease during this period and then recover in one year; we removed this value from Ricker model estimates). We found no relationship between r and N_t according to the linear model ($\beta = -0.0102 - 0.0047$), with a Newey-West correction for autocorrelation giving $\beta = -0.0109 - 0.0054$. However, by 1961, the global human population became locked into a negative phase (the highest-recorded r was from 1962–1963; Fig. 2a), whereby further increases in the population were accompanied by decreasing population growth rate ($\beta = -0.0025 - -0.0023$; $R^2 = 0.952$; Fig. 2a). There was nearly no support for the Gompertz model ($wAIC_c = 0.00052$; evidence ratio of Ricker relative to Gompertz = 1971.6). There was a modest autocorrelation signal in the r time series for the negative phase (partial autocorrelation function showed evidence for a lag effect of 1 and 2 years; Supplementary Information), with a Newey-West correction for autocorrelation returning a slope of $\beta = -0.0025 - -0.0022$ (i.e., nearly identical to the non-autocorrelation corrected confidence interval). Likewise, the 95% confidence intervals of the 10,000 slopes derived from the resampling approach assuming decreasing uncertainty in the population estimates were: 0.0083–0.0140 for the facilitation phase (i.e., positive slope), -0.0173 – 0.0394 for the transition phase (no relationship because the range includes slope = 0), and -0.0026 – -0.0020 for the negative phase (i.e., negative slope). The general trends are therefore robust even with considerable but realistic uncertainty in the annual N_t .

The negative phase beginning in 1962 predates by 8 years the onset in 1970 where global consumption (ecological footprint) exceeded the Earth's biocapacity [29]. In 1970, the Earth transitioned to a global biocapacity deficit (required Earths > 1; Fig. 2a) and has remained so since, likely driven by the rapid fossil fuel-enabled expansion of economic activities that became a global phenomenon following World War II. The phase shift did not arise from an abrupt shift in age structure — indeed, we found a decoupling between r and mean age, and r and proportion of 'young' (< 15 years old) in the global population between 1950 and 1986 (Fig. S8).

3.2 Carrying capacity

Based on the Ricker logistic model, we predicted the population size at $r = 0$ (defined as the Ricker carrying capacity K_R) to occur at 11.66 to 12.40 billion people (Fig. 2b). Assuming no deviation from the expected relationship, we calculate that this would occur between 2067 and 2076 (Fig. 2b). The Newey-West autocorrelation-corrected estimate of K_R was 11.44–12.69 billion (i.e., slightly extending the confidence interval). The resampling approach described in the previous section where we added 1% uncertainty to the United Nations population estimates for the negative phase calculated a maximum population size from the Ricker logistic $K_R = -\hat{\alpha}/\hat{\beta}$, where $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$ are the intercept and slope of the $r \sim N_t$ relationship [Ricker], respectively) of 11.59–13.36 billion, thereby agreeing with our deterministic (non-stochastic) prediction of 11.66–12.40 billion above.

Extending the Ricker logistic model to the intercept (where $N_t = 0$) to calculate the theoretical maximum rate of increase (r_m) gives 0.028–0.029, which agrees well with theoretical predictions of maximum population growth calculated for humans ($r = 0.03$) in the absence of mortality [60]. Likewise, we extended the facilitation relationship back to $N_t = 0$ to calculate $r_m = -0.001 - 0.001$ (median = 0.0003), which also agrees with the realised r_m derived from cohort-based models for non-agropastoralist humans [60].

We estimated facilitation carrying capacity K_f by taking the maximum r during the 1800–1949 facilitation period ($r = 0.011$ from 1929–1930; Fig. 2a) to calculate a global population of approximately 2.47 billion (Fig. 2a). Of course, a truly 'sustainable' population with high average well-being would to some extent depend on many other characteristics beyond demography (e.g., structure, economics, social conditions). However, the general assumption that older, slower-growing populations are less-productive and have lower socio-economic performance than younger, faster-growing populations is not supported by data [61]. Additionally, our estimate of K_f is remarkably close to the global $K = 3.3$ billion previously estimated to allow all people to live in comfort economically [36]. From the

perspective of a sustainable ecological footprint, we also calculated a K of 2.35 billion, assuming a consumption rate of 0.5 Earths to avoid over-consumption (compared to the 1.7 Earths consumed today) and current human population of 8 billion. Taking 1.7 (currently used) Earths $\div 0.5$ (target Earths) estimates that the global human population is 3.4 times too large, and that $K = 8$ billion $\div 3.4 = 2.35$ billion would be 'sustainable' at today's average material standard of living and current consumption distribution [29]. Incidentally, we show that the global population growth rate fell below $r = 0.011$ in 2018 and continues to decline since (Fig. 2a).

3.3 Regional differences

The strongest rate of decline of r with increasing N during the negative phase occurred in Oceania (signal dominated by Australia and New Zealand), then eastern and south-eastern Asia (Fig. 3a), followed by Europe/North America, and Latin America/Caribbean (Fig. 3b-c; Fig. 4). The latter three regions also began their negative phase in the late 1950s or early 1960s (Fig. 3a-c) following the global trend (Fig. 2a). However, the remaining regions' negative phase began later (after 1975; Fig. 3), with Sub-Saharan Africa being the last region to begin a negative phase in 2010 (Fig. 3g; excluding Oceania with Australia and New Zealand). Sub-Saharan Africa is also the region with the weakest rate of decline of r with N and greatest uncertainty in the estimate of K_R given the shortest-available time series during the negative phase (Fig. 3g; Fig. 4). However, even the African countries with the highest fertilities globally still demonstrate signs of a shift to a negative phase over the last few decades (Supplementary Material Appendix IV Fig. S9). Regional differences in the rate of decline in r with N during the negative phase suggest that (i) the rate of decline in population growth is faster in regions with lower mean fertility, (ii) wealthier regions (measured by GDP) have a faster decline in population growth, (iii) the earlier the onset of the negative phase, the faster the rate of decline in population growth, and (iv) there is possibly a faster decline in fertility from immediately before *versus* immediately after the transition to the decline phase in regions with the fastest decline in population growth (Supplementary Material Appendix IV Fig. S10).

Extending the Ricker fits to $r = 0$ for each region's negative phase calculates K_R for each: 3.22–5.18 billion for Sub-Saharan Africa, 2.70–2.96 billion for central/southern Asia, 2.32–2.92 billion for eastern/south-eastern Asia, 0.98–1.46 billion for Europe/North America, 0.90–1.42 billion for North Africa/Western Asia, 0.78–0.84 billion for Latin America/Caribbean, and 0.02–0.11 billion for Oceania (Supplementary Material Appendix IV, Fig. S11). Summing these ranges gives 10.92–14.89 billion, which is a median of only 7.3% higher than the K_R we calculated from the global

data combined (11.66–12.40 billion; Fig. 2b). Although we identified at least one period of facilitation in all regions as well (Fig. 3), the regional data only go back to 1950 and cannot be used reliably to infer the form of the Ricker logistic model for the facilitation phase. Removing China from eastern and south-eastern Asia had little effect on the dynamics of the region, although China alone had the strongest ($R^2 = 0.92$) calculated rate of decline of r with increasing N (slope = -0.0346) compared to any other region (Supplementary Material Appendix IV, Fig. S12c).

3.4 Correspondence to projections

Our calculated estimate of K_R from the Ricker logistic model applied to the negative phase (Fig. 2b) demonstrates the best correspondence to the United Nations *High* [1] and IIASA-JRC *Stalled* scenarios [54,55], but with plateauing occurring as in the United Nations *Medium* and *Probabilistic*, and the IIASA-JRC *Reference* scenarios (Fig. 5). This correspondence supports the higher predictions of population growth under the United Nations *High* and IIASA-JRC *Stalled* scenarios, but with stabilisation and possibly decline starting from around 2070 (Fig. 5).

3.5 Indices of global change

As we hypothesised, we found that the global temperature anomaly was most strongly and positively correlated with the global human population size from 1962 onwards ($r_{N-W}^2 = 0.911$ – 0.928 ; Fig. 6b), even after accounting for temporal autocorrelation. Although we also calculated a positive correlation between temperature anomaly and human population size during the facilitation phase, it is weaker ($r_{N-W}^2 = 0.197$ – 0.353 ; Fig. 6b). Human population size was also a stronger predictor of temperature anomaly, global ecological footprint, and total annual CO₂-e emissions than was per-capita energy consumption (Supplementary Material Appendix III), although we acknowledge that this simple model ignores the complex contribution of technological innovation [62] inherent in any relationship between global change and population size and consumption [63].

4. Discussion

Our predictions of global sustainable carrying capacity and maximum population size are the first to be based on human population time series alone, and the simplicity of phenomenological models [20]. A meta-analysis by van den Bergh and Rietveld [23] examined 51 studies that produced 94 estimates of a limit to the global human population. Their median meta-prediction from these 51 studies was 7.7 billion people, but ranged from 650 million assuming a low-technology future where water availability is the main limiting factor, to 288 billion under the assumption of the 'best' future technology for all countries (with most

estimates well above currently projected future global population sizes). The uncertainty stems mainly from the many different assumptions and dimensions considered in the projections, a problem we avoided by basing our estimates of maximum and sustainable carrying capacity on the population data alone. Others have investigated the multivariate relationships of several human demographic rates and socio-economic factors relative to human density across different spatial scales [2,64-66]. For example, Lutz and Qiang [2] found strong relationships between country-level total fertility rate and population density (measured per area of arable land), but only a weak relationship between r and population density. However, no previous study has investigated the evidence for relationships between r and N at the global or regional scales as we did here.

The mechanisms driving the phenomenon of a decline in r within increasing global human population size are necessarily complex, and likely include both direct and indirect pathways leading to reduced population growth. Population growth is an ensemble property emerging primarily from two main component demographic rates — fertility and survival [20]. In modern human societies, fertility has the greatest effect on population growth [2], and indeed declined during the negative phase globally and regionally (Supplementary Material Appendix IV Fig. S13). In contrast, survival (measured as the life expectancy at birth) increased throughout the negative $r \sim N$ phase, despite population growth simultaneously declining (Supplementary Material Appendix IV Fig. S14). However, although the onsets of the fertility declines were contemporaneous with the beginning of the negative $r \sim N$ phase globally (Fig. S14a) and in eastern/south-eastern Asia, Europe/North America, and Latin America/Caribbean (Fig. S14b-d), they began earlier than the onset of the negative phase in central/southern Asia, Oceania, north Africa/western Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa (Supplementary Material Fig. S12e-h). The fact that the lowest-income regions of the world began their descent into the negative $r \sim N$ phase later than in higher-income regions (where development started earlier) also supports the notion that the intensity of development via the exploitation of fossil fuels was the main driver of the transition from facilitation.

The extent to which human population growth varies in response to (i) environmental constraints such as access to sufficient land, and the efficiency with which we can extract and consume fresh water, food, energy, and other material resources [23], (ii) decreasing fertility from chemical exposure [67], and (iii) people choosing to reduce fertility (e.g., following the principles outlined in the ‘demographic transition’ paradigm) [68] are context-specific. Indeed, any negative feedback is not required to act through direct biological mechanisms alone, because even perceptions of population impacts [53] (e.g., crowding, competition for

resources, conflict) can be psychological determinants of human choices regarding fertility [2,25,36], empowerment, and reduced child mortality [69]. Enhanced by the exploitation of fossil fuels (e.g., household automation technologies), these components have ironically also played a strong role in fertility reductions globally.

The abrupt switch from a positive to a negative phase in the calculated relationship between r and N demonstrates that human ingenuity, technology, energy production, and social structure have not led to human population growth since the 1940s. While estimates of human carrying capacity derived from logistic models are straightforward and elegant, they cannot necessarily predict the future. Our estimates assume that the form of the Ricker logistic model will remain constant until $r = 0$, but global phenomena such as unmitigated climate change and environmental collapse [70-72] could, because of cumulative effects, decouple the calculated linear relationship between r and N sooner. Our approach also assumes that population size is equivalent to *density* (individuals per unit area), the latter of which has more direct mechanistic influences on human demography such as child morbidity and mortality [73], infectious disease [74], and total fertility rate [2] than population size *per se*. Nonetheless, the ensemble signal strength of the negative phase is rather insensitive to variation in carrying capacity itself, although it tends to underestimate component effects (i.e., how sensitive demographic rates are to changes in population size) when abundance is trending strongly over time [20]. Given that the global human population has been increasing consistently on average for thousands of years, and is still at one of its highest rates of increase, the rate of the decline in r with increasing N we observed in the global data is likely under- rather than over-estimated. This suggests that the negative phase will continue unabated for several more decades at least.

Regardless, it is clear that Earth cannot sustain the future human population, or even today’s, without a major overhaul of socio-cultural practices for using land, water, energy, biodiversity, and other resources [22]. As such, some form of societal downscaling [sensu 22] appears inevitable, whether achieved actively or in response to continued declines in population growth [27]. Instead of focusing on a ‘maximum’ carrying capacity, the number of humans that can be safely imposed on the environment is a function of both population size and per-capita consumption [26,63], both of which are continuing to rise [53]. As such, any form of future development under the umbrella of ‘sustainability’ must meet the needs and aspirations of present societies while simultaneously ensuring that future generations can meet their own [37]. This cannot be achieved in the pursuit of a maximum population size, no matter how well-defined, especially considering that smaller populations beget more individual and environmental benefits [53]. Today’s

economies predicated on uninterrupted growth apparently [75] do not recognise the regenerative constraints of sustained population expansion, because fossil fuels artificially make up the difference [76]. Nor do economies anticipate the looming reductions in regenerative capacity as climate disruptions intensify [75]. The tragedy is that human endeavour has short-circuited the ultimately inevitable corrective feedback loops carrying capacity imposes, without replacing them with humane and environmentally friendly corrective feedbacks.

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References


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FIGURES

Figure 1. Global human population size from 1000 to present (main figure) and from 1800 to present [1,40,42,44] (black line; inset). Dark grey circles with confidence limits derived from the upper and lower estimates of several sources [38,39,41,43,45,46]. Inset shows approximate magnitude (green bars; casualties) of major human mortality events (with ≥ 1 million deaths) since 1800 (right y axis; green; see references below figure for sources).



mortality events listed: 1. Napoleonic wars (7 million) [77], 2. Irish famine (1 million) [78]; 3. Taiping rebellion (30 million) [79], 4. Dungan revolt (21 million) [80], 5. British India famine (10.3 million) [81], 6. northern Chinese famine (10 million) [82], 7. Indian famine (19 million) [83], 8. World War I (10.1 million) [58], 9. Iranian famine (8–10 million) [84], 10. influenza pandemic (25–50 million) [57], 11. Russian civil war (1 million) [58], 12. Russian famine (5–10 million) [85], 13. Soviet famine (8.7 million) [86], 14. Chinese civil war (1.2 million) [58], 15. 2nd Sino-Japanese war (1–4 million) [58,87] and 16. famine (6 million) [87], 17. World War II (50 million) [58], 18. Korean war (1 million) [58], 19. Chinese famine (15–45 million) [59], 20. Vietnam war (2 million) [58], 21. Nigerian civil war (1 million) [88] and 22. famine (2 million) [89], 23. Chinese Cultural Revolution (2 million) [58], 24. Cambodian genocide (3.4 million) [90], 25. 2nd Congo civil war (2.5 million) [91] and 26. famine (5.4 million) [92], 27. COVID-19 (13.23–16.58 million) [93]

Figure 2. (a) Relationship between the instantaneous (annual) exponential rate of change ($r = \log_e(N_{t+1}/N_t)$) and population size (N_t) at year t from 1800 to 2023. There is a positive relationship between r and N_t 1800 and 1949, indicating facilitation. The dotted horizontal line intersecting 1929–1930 indicates the highest r observed during the facilitation phase (0.011). The negative r shown for 1949–1950 is an artefact of global census data being standardised from 1950 onward. However, following WWII through the 1950s there was a period of transition toward high r , but no relationship with N_t , and then the establishment of a negative $r \sim N_t$ relationship from around 1961–1962 to the present. Also shown on the right y axis is the ecological footprint expressed in terms of number of Earth's required to meet global human consumption — at 1 ‘Earth’, the global ecological footprint (ecological assets the global population requires to produce the natural resources it consumes and to absorb its wastes) equals the Earth’s biocapacity (productivity of ecological assets, including cropland, grazing land, forest land, fishing grounds, and built-up land) [29]. The global ecological footprint has exceeded the Earth’s biocapacity since 1970 (transition from blue to pink). **(b)** Ricker and Gompertz logistic relationships for the facilitation and negative phases (Akaike’s information criterion weights $wAIC_c$ shown for each model for each phase) indicate most support for the Ricker model. Extending the fitted Ricker relationship between r and N_t to where $r(y) = 0$ indicates maximum (biophysical) global population size ($K_R = -\text{intercept} \div \text{slope}$). Assuming no deviation from this expected relationship, $K_R = 11.66$ to 12.40 billion people predicted to occur between 2065 and 2074. Extending the negative relationship back to $N_t(x) = 0$ (intercept) indicates the theoretical maximum rate of increases predicted for human beings in the absence of mortality (r_m): 0.0281 to 0.0296, which agrees well with the cohort-based prediction [60] of r_m for humans = 0.03. Extending the facilitation relationship back to $N_t(x) = 0$ (intercept) gives $r_m = -0.001$ to 0.001 (median = 0.0003), the upper limit of which is close to the predicted rate of hunter-gatherer population growth derived from cohort-based models ($r_m = 0.003$) [60]. Red (Ricker) and green (Gompertz) shading around logistic fits indicate 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 3. Relationship between the instantaneous (annual) exponential rate of change ($r = \log_e(N_{t+1}/N_t)$) and population size (N) (Ricker logistic) at year t from 1950 to 2023 for seven major global regions, sorted by descending magnitude of slope (rate of decline of r with increasing N ; see also Fig. 4). Also shown are the Gompertz logistic relationships, and the Akaike's information criterion weights (w_{AIC_c}) for each model mostly indicate dominant support for the Ricker model (or nearly identical dynamics from the Gompertz when that model's w_{AIC_c} is higher). N for each region are first scaled so that slopes are comparable (Fig. 4). (a) eastern and south-eastern Asia, (b) Europe and North America, (c) Latin America and Caribbean, (d) central and southern Asia, (e) Oceania, (f) northern Africa and western Asia, (g) Sub-Saharan Africa. Vertical dotted line in each panel indicates the onset of the period of the negative phase (> 1961) from the global data (Fig. 2). The year when the negative phase began in each region shown in each panel. Red (Ricker) and green (Gompertz) shading around logistic fits indicate 95% confidence intervals.




Figure 4. Resampled (10,000 iterations) of the Ricker logistic slope β , where more negative values indicate increasing rate of decline in the instantaneous exponential rate of annual growth ($r = \log_e(N_{t+1}/N_t)$ relative to population size (N , scaled, but not centred, using the *scale* function in R to ensure $\hat{\beta}$ are on the same scale) at time t per major global region from 1950–2023. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Regions ordered from most negative β to least negative β . See also Fig. 3.




Figure 5. Past trajectory and future projections of the global human population from the most-plausible [31] models of the United Nations (UN) and IIASA-JRC. Dotted black lines are the *Medium* and *High* scenarios from the UN [1], and the *Reference* and *Stalled* scenarios from the IIASA-JRC [54,55]; grey-shaded area is the 95% confidence interval for the UN *Probabilistic* Population Projections [1]. Red shading indicates the maximum human carrying capacity derived from the Ricker model ($K_R = 11.66\text{--}12.40$) and timing (2067–2076) derived from Fig. 2b.




Figure 6. (a) Global human population size (black line; right y axis) with the 95% confidence interval of the global temperature anomaly (°C) derived from the HadCRUT.5.0.2.0 ensemble model [56] compared to the 1961–1990 baseline superimposed (red; left y axis). (b) Relationship between global human population size and temperature anomaly for the three main phases of human demography from 1850 to the present: *i.* facilitation (1850–1949; dark grey background shading), *ii.* transition (1950–1961; light grey background shading), and *iii.* the negative phase (1962–2023; peach background shading). Shown for each phase are the 95% confidence intervals for the linear-model evidence ratios (ER), and the Newey-West heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-corrected goodness of fits ($N-WR^2$), slopes ($N-W\beta$), and probabilities of Type I error ($N-Wp$). Red shading indicates 95% confidence interval of the linear fits in phases *i* and *iii*.

